The paper examines a general class of multi-unit auctions. The class of games investigated includes uniform-price, pay-your-bid, all-pay and Vickrey auctions as special cases. The seller offers k identical units of goods and sets the minimum accepted bid. Bidders have atomless valuation distributions and they submit up to k bids. For this class, the existence of Nash equilibrium in a measurable strategy space and weakly increasing pure strategy space is proven. In many cases any equilibrium strategies can be modified in such a way that they form a pure strategy equilibrium. Properties of standard strategies in multi-unit auctions are analyzed.
INTRODUCTION
Until recently multi-unit auctions have received less attention than singleunit auctions in theoretical studies although Internet auctions of multiple units of goods and auctions of bundles of licences for mobile phone systems are ubiquitous. The theoretical results on multi-unit auctions are not as straightforward and powerful as those for single-unit auctions. This paper is an addendum to an enlarging literature focusing on existence of equilibrium in multi-unit auctions (see McAdams (2006) , Jackson and Swinkels (2005) , Athey (2001) and others).
In this paper, multi-unit auctions with independent private values and sellers' reservation prices are analyzed. I focus on a class of auctions that includes uniform-price, "Dutch", Vickrey, all-pay, and pay-your-bid auctions.
I first prove the existence of equilibria for auctions in this class (which is defined by assumptions A1 -A5 detailed below).
In auctions of non-divisible goods, bidders' payoffs are not continuous. In the literature on equilibria in discontinuous games Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Reny (1999) and Simon (1987) , the class of multi-unit auctions has posed particular challenges. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) , Amman and Leininger (1996) and Krishna and Morgan (1997) provide insightful analyses of classes of single-unit auctions using differential equations. This approach is difficult to extend to multi-unit auctions because we know less about systems of vector differential equations than we know about scalar differential equations. Below I therefore propose a different approach. Specifically, I prove the existence of an equilibrium in which bidders bid below their expected values. I investigate the shape of the payoff function at discontinuities that 2 result from ties. A tie occurs when two or more submitted bids are equal but the seller, while satisfying at least one of them, can not satisfy all of the equal bids.
Consider a strategy profile of two bidders each of them submitting a tied bid with positive probability. If the profile is an equilibrium, then either a) both bidders are indifferent whether winning or losing the tie, or b) with probability 1 the tie-breaking rule makes the winner that bidder who prefers to win the tie and the loser that bidder who does not prefer to win the tie (see example 4 in Section 3 below). Otherwise, since the payoff function jumps at the discontinuity, the tied bidder has incentive to deviate from her strategy negligibly to achieve almost the same payoff as if winning or losing the tie.
In many economic applications, it is natural to use a random rule to break a tie. Clearly, by its very nature such a rule does, however, not allow to win or lose a tie with probability 1 or 0. It is, however, possible in some circumstances to find an equilibrium with a tie-breaking rule that allows to break a tie in favor of one bidder with probability 1 since then the sum of bidder's payoffs is upper-semi continuous in expectation given a bidder's value (see Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Reny (1999) and Simon (1987) ).
The main idea of the paper is to consider a class of auction games such that the equilibrium profile exists when using a tie-breaking rule that allows to break a tie in favor of one bidder with probability 1 and in such a manner that in any equilibrium profile no tie occurs with positive probability. Therefore it does not matter whether the seller uses the random tie-breaking rule or not.
I demonstrate that ties do not occur with positive probability in equi-3 librium since every bidder (bidding below her value) is better off if she bids ever so slightly above the tie. Therefore, when searching for an equilibrium, one can a priori eliminate all strategy profiles in which ties occur with positive probability. This allows me to assume that the seller then chooses any tie-breaking rule he desires without influencing the set of bidder equilibrium strategies. The existence theorem by Reny (1999) , applied to one specific tie-breaking rule, then guarantees the existence of equilibrium for any tiebreaking rule (e.g. the "random" rule that is usually considered in the literature). The approach proposed here was outlined in Bresky (1999) and uses an idea similar to Lebrun (1996) . It is an alternative proof to the one used in Jackson and Swinkels (2005) who show the existence of mixed strategy equilibria for more general class of auctions applying the tie-breaking invariance on bidders equilibrium profiles. The proof provides a new approach applying result of Reny (1999) to establish an equilibrium existence in multi-unit auctions when the bidder mixes over weakly increasing strategies.
For multi-unit auctions with strictly increasing payoff function in bidder's own bid e.g. for all-pay auctions, pay-your-bid auctions, their convex combinations, bidders use pure strategies in equilibrium that are weakly increasing in bidder's own value. For all other auctions in the class of multi-unit auctions, every mixed best response can be mapped to a pure weakly increasing best response that yields the same payoff to the bidder and the same distribution of a bidder's bids. Then, opposing bidders have the same payoff for whatever strategy they use. This mapping can be made for all players simultaneously yielding an equilibrium in weakly increasing pure strategies. Therefore, if one finds a specific property of an equilibrium in weakly in-creasing pure strategies that depends only on the distribution of bids, then all equilibria must satisfy this property. In other words, including mixed or decreasing strategies in the set of admissible strategies complicates the analysis but does not yield different results. This result is not valid in general, e.g. if one relaxes independent distributions of values. The idea is similar to McAdams (2006) who shows that if bidder's signals are independent and private and valuations are increasing in own signal and non-decreasing in others' signals for the multi-unit uniform-price auction, then equilibrium exists. This paper complements the literature showing the importance of better reply security as defined in Reny (1999) that generalizes to ideas of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . Similar "purification" result is known in other games with private information including Khan and Sun (1995) , Radner and Rosenthal (1982) , and Milgrom and Webber (1985) .
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the multi-unit auction games considered here are defined. In Section 3 I show why ties can not occur in equilibrium, and why, hence, the equilibrium set does not depend on the choice of tie-breaking rule. In Section 4 I demonstrate that the auction is payoff secure as defined in Reny (1999) and that the payoff sum is upper semi-continuous with an efficient tie-breaking rule. These two conditions are sufficient for the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in the space of weakly increasing strategies. In Section 5, I prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies that are weakly increasing. I also show that equilibria are in pure strategies only. This result requires me to restrict the analysis to auction games with continuous valuation distributions. The Appendix collects some proofs and lemmas.
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MULTI-UNIT-AUCTION GAMES AND THEIR
BASIC PROPERTIES
Consider n (n ≥ 1) risk-neutral bidders with continuous private valuation distributions and a seller who would like to auction k (k ≥ 1) identical units of goods to these bidders. The seller specifies publicly a reservation price R ∈ [0, ∞) for his goods. In general, the seller could choose different reservation prices for different units. Simple way how to implement it is described in Jackson and Swinkels (2005) . They consider reservation prices as additional bids that compeete with regular bidder bids without any effect on the existence of equilibria. Each bidder i draws values
from her private valuation distribution where v i,j is the value of the jth unit j=1 v i,j . I assume that the marginal value from winning an additional unit weakly decreases for each bidder, i.e. v i,j ≥ v i,j ′ if j < j ′ . Each bidder submits k sealed bids If more than k bids are above or equal to the reservation price R, then the seller chooses the k highest bids as the winning bids. A tie occurs when the kth and k + 1st highest bids are equal. 3 I assume that the seller breaks ties according to a reasonable tie-breaking rule T . Each reasonable tie-breaking rule T has to determine at least one winning bid and at least one losing bid.
A typical tie-breaking rule that does the job selects randomly the winning bids from among those bids that are tied. I shall call this rule the random rule. If fewer than k + 1 bids are above or equal to the reservation price R, then each of them wins a unit.
I denote the set of all admissible bid k-tuples of one bidder as 
where p 
. As we will see presently, −p l i,j (b, R) plays a role in all-pay auctions.
Example 1
The following multi-unit auctions with independent private values are consistent with the setting above.
1. Uniform-price auction -the price for winning any unit is the k + 1st highest bidc = max (b i,J i +1 , c k+1−J i ) if more than k bids above R are submitted; otherwise the price for winning a unit is R.
5 The price for losing a unit is 0.
2. Dutch auction -the price for winning any unit is the kth highest bidc ′ = max (b i,J i , c k−J i ) if more than k bids above R are submitted; otherwise the price for winning a unit is R. The price for losing a unit is 0.
3. Vickrey auction -the price for winning the jth unit is the k + 1 − jth highest opponent bid c k+1−j , if more than k + 1 − j opponent bids above reservation price are submitted; otherwise the price for winning a unit is R. The price for losing a unit is 0.
4. Pay-your-bid auction -the price for winning any unit is the bidder's bid. The price for losing a unit is 0.
5. All-pay auction -the price for both winning and losing any unit is the bidders' bid for that unit or reservation price R.
6. All convex combinations of payoffs of auctions 1-5 above.
A strategy of bidder i specifies i's bids based on the information she has before the auction. This information includes her private values, the number of opponents and their valuation distributions, the seller's reservation price, and the number of units for sale. For the sake of simplicity I will write pure strategies as a function of private values only. A measurable strategy of bidder i is therefore a mapping 
Expectations are taken over opponent values v −i . The probability measure of
is induced by the opponent strategies b −i (·) , and a tie-breaking rule T for ties that occur with positive probability. In the following I will use the word interim payoff to denote a bidder's interim expected payoff after she has learned her values but before she submits her bids. In contrast, a bidder computes her ex ante payoff before she has learnt her values. Correspondingly I denote interim best response I will denote a bids b i of bidder i whose values
When bidder i uses her pure strategy b i (·), then her ex ante pure strategy payoff is
where the expectations are taken over v i .
The class of auctions I study is defined by the following assumptions on the ex post price of any unit j = 1, · · · k of any bidder i = 1, · · · n. I shall refer to these auctions as standard from here on. The bid b i,j can win only if it is above or equal to reservation price R and k + 1 − jth opponent bid (b i,j ≥ max (c k+1−j , R)). Therefore I discuss the properties of the winning prices and the ex post payoffs in this case only. Similarly, I discuss the properties of the losing prices and the ex post payoffs only for the case that the bid b i,j is below or equal to reservation price R and k + 1 − jth opponent bid (b i,j ≤ max (c k+1−j , R)).
In this paper, I will focus on auctions with monotonic and additively separable prices. The proofs that auctions from Example 1 satisfy assumptions A2-A4 are trivial and hence omitted.
The last assumption requires that there is a weakly increasing upper bound of strategyb i (·) such that in a tie belowb i (·) , a bidder has an incentive to bid above the tie, and for any bid above the upper bound there is another
and if max(R, c k+1−j ≥ b i,j ) and max(R, c
bid below the upper bound that brings at least as high a payoff as the bid above the upper bound.
There is a weakly increasing upper bound strategȳ b i (·) such that for any values v i and any bids b i of bidder i and for any strategy of her opponents:
1. no bidder i has an incentive to submit jth bid aboveb i,j (v i ), 9 and 2. the ex post winning payoff is greater than the ex post losing payoff if there is a tie below the upper boundb i (·).
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Specifically, in the auctions in Example 1, no bidder has an incentive to bid above her value. 11 In auctions (5) and (6) a bidder who submits her jth bid above her jth value has a nonpositive winning or losing jth unit payoff.
Therefore if that bidder bids 0 instead, she is not worse off because her losing unit payoff is 0. In auctions (2), (4) and (5), a bidder who submits her jth bid above her jth value when the k + 1 − jth highest opponent bid is above her value has nonpositive winning and losing jth unit payoff. Therefore if that bidder bids her value instead, she is not worse off because her winning and losing jth unit payoff is 0. When the k + 1 − jth highest opponent bid is below the bidder's value and the bidder bids on his value instead of above the value, then she is better off. In addition, in any of these auctions, if any
This assumption is an analog of No dumb bid rule in Jackson and Swinkels (2005) . bid b i,j below the value is tied with the k +1−jth highest opponent bid, then the bidder strictly prefers wining the tie to losing it. In simple auctions in Example 1, the upper bound strategyb i,j (v i,j ) that fulfills the two properties can be defined as the value v i,j .
I discuss the last assumption in the Appendix in more detail because it is not a condition on primitives. Briefly, in lemma 14 and 15 in the Appendix I formulate two sets of conditions on the winning and losing price functions under which an auction game satisfies A5. I also illustrate these lemmas are applicable to a convex combination of simple auctions from Example 1.
I will denote the set of bidder i's measurable strategies
with each jth component below or equal tob i,j (v i ) as B i and the set of these measurable strategy profiles as B = × n i=1 B i . In Sections 3 and 4, I show the existence of equilibrium in a weakly increasing strategy spacê
The mixed strategy spaceM i is a Borel sigma algebra generated on a pure strategy spaceB i . The standard results of probability theory imply thatB i is a subset of B i because any bounded weakly increasing strategy is measurable and thatB i andM i are compact metric spaces (see Lemma 16 in the Appendix).
When opponents use mixed strategies m −i fromM −i then we can define interim payoffs and ex ante pure strategy payoffs to bidder i. They differ from (8) and (9) only in probability measure of
where the expectation is taken over b i (·) that bidder i uses in mixed strategy m i .
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Note that i's payoff is the same for a given distribution of opponent bids whether it was generated by mixed or measurable opponent strategies. I omit opponent strategies, reservation price and the tie-breaking rule in the payoff argument list to simplify notation.
TIES AND TIE-BREAKING RULE EQUIV-ALENCE
Let us now investigate the effect of tie-breaking rules on the bidder's payoff.
In Section 1 I defined a tie from the seller's point of view. From the bidder's point of view, if a tie occurs with probability 0 in equilibrium, then it does not influence her payoff. When discussing ties below I consider only the ties that occur with positive probability for a given opponent's strategies.
Let me demonstrate that for a given opponent's strategy, the best response payoff for a bidder i who bids below her value must be at least as high as when every tie is broken in her favor. Assume that the seller's reservation price is 0 and consider a tie in strategies b i,j that occurs with positive 12 One can decrease both winning and losing payoff by a fixed amount interpreted as information costs to each bidder for finding out unit values. It has no effect on the shape of equilibrium strategies if the costs are not so high to deter any bidder from finding out this information. 14 probability and that is not surely broken in favor of bidder i. If the opponent's k + 1 − jth highest bid is b i,j and the bidder bids b i,j + ε instead of b i,j , she wins the tied unit surely at a slightly increased price. Since the bidder ex post prefers winning over losing the tied unit, for small ε her ex post and therefore interim payoff increases (by a jump) for a set of values of positive measure. For simplicity assume that the auction price is uniformly continuous in bids and that bidder i submits all her bids ε higher whether there is a tie or not. Then for sufficiently small ε the ex post and therefore ex ante auction price paid for any of her units changes negligibly and with negligible effect on her ex ante payoff. Therefore i's best response payoff cannot be worse than her payoff when winning every tie surely.
One important implication of this finding is that there are no ties in equilibrium for a reasonable tie breaking rules as long as each bidder submits her jth bid below her jth value. Since every bidder strictly prefers winning a tie over losing it and since the seller cannot satisfy all tied bids, the bidder who does not surely win every tie has incentive to increase her strategy by ε to win the tied unit. I formalize this idea in the following lemma that is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 Consider a standard multi-unit auction game and opponent measurable strategies b −i (·) ∈ B −i or mixed weakly increasing strategies m −i ∈ M i . If there is a tie with positive probability so that it is not broken in the favor of bidder i with positive probability when using
Moreover for any measurable best response b i (·) ∈ B i the bidder payoff must be at least as high as if every tie that occurs with positive probability the seller breaks in bidder i's favor.
What are the effects of a particular tie-breaking rule on the set of equilibria? Lemma 2 shows that no strategy b i (·) with a tie that occurs with positive probability for given opponent strategies is the equilibrium best response. Since at any tie at least one bidder does not win the unit, that bidder deviates to win the unit. In other words, when searching for equilibrium in the set of all player profiles one can a priori eliminate the profiles in which the tie occurs. But no tie-breaking rule influences the payoff at these profiles without ties. Therefore choosing a particular tie-breaking rule has no influence on the best response strategy payoff and any equilibrium found for one rule T is also equilibrium for any other rule T ′ .
Theorem 3 Consider the two standard multi-unit auction games that differ only in a tie-breaking ruleĜ
Ties occur with probability 0 in equilibrium and the set of equilibria of the gameĜ coincides with that ofĜ ′ .
Proof. Consider a profile m with a tie which occurs with positive probability. Assume that bidder i strictly prefers winning to losing the tie and that bidder i loses the tie with positive probability when using b i (·) ∈B i . By the nature of a tie at least one bidder does not win the unit for any positive measure of pure strategies b i (·) in the support of m i . For any such b i (·) there is a better strategy b ε i (·) by Lemma 2 and therefore m is not an equilibrium. Since the payoff in profiles without ties is independent of using T or T ′ , the set of equilibria coincides for bothĜ andĜ ′ .
In Section 4 I choose the tie-breaking rule that is the most suitable to finding the equilibrium strategy profile. This strategy profile is also the equilibrium for other tie-breaking rules according to Theorem 3. Let me illustrate that Theorem 3 is not valid for some discontinuous distributions of values.
Example 4 Consider a single-unit first-price or single-unit second-price auction with two bidders and a zero reservation price. The first bidder has a value of 1, and the opponent's value is distributed uniformly on (1, 2] . If the seller uses the tie-breaking rule that surely breaks the ties in favor of the second bidder, there exists an equilibrium in which both bidders bid surely 1. But it is not an equilibrium if the seller breaks the tie randomly because the second bidder is strictly better off if bidding 1 + ε for a sufficiently small positive ε.
Moreover Lebrun (1996) , in his footnote 1, shows that no equilibrium exists for this first-price auction with the random rule. They ultimately, however, restrict their attention to auction games in which the tie-breaking rule is irrelevant. In a sense, I go a different but closely related route.
Since the tie-breaking rule is irrelevant as I have shown in Section 3, In my approach I apply ideas from standard existence results by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Reny (1999) , and Simon (1987) . Specifically, I construct a specific tie-breaking rule T e called the efficient tie-breaking rule for which the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed by Reny (1999) . The efficient tiebreaking rule T e maximizes the sum of bidder ex post payoffs when a tie occurs. This rule thus awards the tied unit to the bidder who values the unit the most. Following this rule, the sum of bidder's payoffs is upper semicontinuous and the payoff function is "payoff secure" (Reny (1999) ) in the sense of a specific bidder being able to guarantee herself almost the same payoff if her opponents change their strategies slightly. These properties are sufficient for the existence of equilibrium.
The following definition formulates a specific tie-breaking rule for the seller when a tie occurs.
Definition 5 Let us call efficient tie-breaking rule T e the rule in which the seller breaks any tie in favor of bidder i who gets a higher ex post payoff than his opponents −i from winning the tied unit. If there is a tie in bids and ex post payoffs are equal, then the tie is broken randomly.
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The efficient tie-breaking rule requires, unfortunately, the seller to have private information about the values of the bidders. This assumption does not reflect real-life auctions well and is indeed not used in the literature.
Fortunately, the fact that the efficient tie-breaking rule is not implementable is not crucial because the equilibrium strategies remain in equilibrium for any tie-breaking rule, in particular the standard random one.
Definition 6
The ex ante payoff function π i (m, T, R) is payoff secure at profile m ∈M if for every δ > 0, player i has a strategy m
The function π i (m, T, R) is payoff secure if it is payoff secure for every m ∈ M . 
The theorem by Reny (1999) 15 The auction game does not satisfy "complementarity discontinuity property" introduced by Simon (1987) that requires some player's payoff jump up whenever some other player's payoff jumps down.
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Along the sequence bidder 2 wins v 2,2 but at the limit (lim b + 2,2 = b 1,1 ) the seller breaks this tie randomly between bidder 1 and 2 giving them value v 1,1 +v 2,2 2 on average. At the limit the price is the same and the payoff sum difference is
In this case the payoff sum jumps down. If this situation occurs with positive probability, then i π i (m, T r , R) is not upper semi-continuous (see Billingsley (1968) ).
If the seller uses an efficient tie-breaking rule, then the auction payoff is summation upper semi-continuous because the payoff cannot jump down at ties and the "out-of-ties" sum of payoffs is continuous by A4. 16 For more details see Lemma 18 in the Appendix. Now using the efficient rule, I can show that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
Theorem 9 Consider a standard auction with the efficient tie-breaking rulê
k units for sale and n bidders. Then a mixed strategy equilibrium m * exists inĜ e . Moreover if the bidders are symmetric, a symmetric equilibrium exists.
Proof. Using Lemma 16 it is clear thatM i is compact metric spaces. In addition, mixed strategy payoff (10) is bounded from above because V i is bounded, payoff secure and summation upper-semi continuous (see Lemma 16 In the example 8, T Symmetric bidders choose their strategies from the same strategy setM i , and i's payoff does not depend on the permutation of the opponents' strategies. 17 Since symmetry is a weaker condition than quasi-symmetry, payoff security is a weaker condition than the payoff security along the diagonal and payoff is continuous when all bidders use the same strategy fromM i , one can use Proposition 5.1 and Corollary 5.3 of the theorem 4.1 in Reny (1999) to show that the game possesses a symmetric equilibrium.
Theorems 3 and 9 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 10 In a standard auction gameĜ
with the random tie-breaking rule consistent, mixed equilibrium m * exists.
Corollary 10 shows that equilibrium in weakly increasing strategies exists for the random tie-breaking rule. In the next section I will show that any other measurable strategy cannot be better off. The equilibrium with random tie-breaking rule may not exist for discontinuous valuations if there is a tie that a specific bidder wins or loses with probability 1 or 0 in equilibrium with efficient tie-breaking rule as illustrated in Example 4.
It seems possible to generalize Theorem 9 to discontinuous distributions of values although it requires specific restrictions specific for each multi-unit auction format so that the results by Lebrun (1996) 
for more details see Reny (1999) .
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valuations are increasing in own signal and non-decreasing in others' signals can be incorporated; the proof however exceeds the scope of this paper. An intuitive argument is that in auctions 1-4 of Example 1 the bidder who bids her value is indifferent between winning or losing a tie because she has a zero payoff anyway. In the proof of Lemma 2 I ruled out ties in which a bidder submits a high bid equal to her value since it is a probability zero event for continuous distributions. In the case of discontinuous distributions one can realize that in such a tie the bidder's ex post payoff is continuous in her bids, and hence payoff secure. A seller who uses an efficient tie-breaking rule breaks the tie in favor of the bidder with highest payoff, thus making bidders' payoff summation upper semi-continuous.
These properties are sufficient to extend Theorem 9 for auction games with efficient tie-breaking rule when bidders' valuation distributions are not continuous (see Example 4). Unfortunately, Theorem 3 is not valid for all discontinuous valuation distributions.
One can however restrict the valuation distributions in such a way that in any mass point above the reservation price in the support of the jth value marginal distribution, the probability that k − j or more opponents' values are above or equal to v i,j is less than 1. This implies that for any mass point value v i,j the bidder i has a positive probability of winning in a pay-yourbid auction because all opponents bid at most their values. Therefore it is a better response to bid v i,j − ε instead of v i,j for a bidder with value v i,j and sufficiently small ε. Then in equilibrium there is no tie (occurring with positive probability) that a specific bidder wins or loses with probability 1 or 0 and Corollary 10 holds (see Reny (1999) for an alternative proof). Similar 23 restrictions are specific for other multi-unit auction games.
EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN MEASUR-ABLE STRATEGY SPACE
In this section, I show first that the mixed equilibrium strategies in the space of weakly increasing strategiesM identified in Section 4 are pure or can be changed to be pure. The pure strategy is the best response whenever the mixed is and yields the same distribution of bidder's bids, and hence, the opponents face the same decision-making problem. These pure strategies form an equilibrium in measurable strategy space or even if each bidder i chooses his strategy after knowing his values v i .
18 Such a "purification" can be made in other games with private value information Khan and Sun (1995) , Radner and Rosenthal (1982) , and Milgrom and Webber (1985) .
I then show that for any equilibrium in mixed or measurable strategies exists equilibrium in pure weakly increasing strategies with the same bid distributions. Therefore any specific property of auctions that depends on the equilibrium distribution of bids and that is valid for the set of all equilibria in pure weakly increasing strategies must be valid for all mixed equilibria.
This result was discussed in McAdams (2006) For a multi-unit auction one can construct the pure weakly increasing best response strategy generating the same distribution of bids along one dimension. After iterating this process along different strategies one gets a strategy that is the pure weakly increasing best response strategy generating the same distribution of bids along all dimensions.
The following proposition is proven in the Appendix; it shows that instead of a mixed or nonincreasing best response a bidder can use a pure weakly increasing strategy that yields the same payoff to her and that generates the same distribution of her bids as the mixed or nonincreasing best response.
Proposition 11 In a standard auction consider the best response m i ∈M i The second part of Proposition 11 says that the best response strategy is pure weakly increasing in all-pay and pay-your-bid auctions where the winning price of the jth unit strictly increases in jth unit bid. The first part of Proposition 11 says that for other standard auctions a mixed or nondecreasing measurable best response can be modified to be pure weakly increasing. This "purification" result is known for special cases from other studies of auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1995a) , and Lizzeri and Persico (1996) ). Intuitively, if a bidder i for value v An implication of Proposition 11 is that for a given valules and opponent strategies the interim best response bidsb i (v i ) that are weakly increasing in values exist (up to a measure zero subset of values). They form an equilibrium not only in mixed strategy space but also in the game in which each bidder knows his values v i at first, and then selects an optimal bid list b i ∈ B or a probability distribution over the bid set B. Such an auction structure is more intuitive and indeed typically used in the auction literature.
Theorem 12 In the standard multi-unit auction game, equilibriumb (·) in measurable strategy space exists such that all bidders use weakly increasing
Proof. Fix the equilibrium m * in the weakly increasing strategies from Theorem 9. The weakly increasing strategyb i (v i ) constructed in Proposition 11 is the best response for every v i , and hence no measurable best response is better. Since strategyb i (v i ) preserves the distribution of bids, the profilê b i (·) ,m * −i forms an equilibrium. After changing the opponent strategies tô b −i (·) , the weakly increasing equilibriumb (·) in measurable strategy space is constructed. It is an equilibrium even if each bidder chooses her bids after knowing her values.
Theorem 12 does not show that every equilibrium in weakly increasing strategies is pure. But the same steps as in the proof of this theorem can be done for any other best response. In any mixed equilibrium all bidders can change their strategies to form equilibrium in pure strategies. In any measurable equilibrium all bidders can change their strategies to form weakly increasing equilibrium. In the newly formed equilibrium no bidder faces any change in her strategic considerations and they have the same payoffs. This property is valid for all equilibria in standard auctions with the random tiebreaking rule that I summarize in the following corollary.
Corollary 13 Consider the standard multi-unit auction with a random tiebreaking rule. Then any mixed weakly increasing equilibrium strategy m i ∈ M i can be rearranged to be pure, and any measurable equilibrium strategy b i (·) ∈ B i can be rearranged to be weakly increasing in such a way that the bid distribution is not changed. Moreover if p w i,j (·) increases in b i,j , then every mixed best response belowb (v i ) is pure on values that win with positive probability and every measurable best response belowb (v i ) is weakly increasing on values that win with positive probability.
An implication of this feature is that any possible equilibrium bid distribution is generated by weakly increasing equilibrium strategies. That is why the results of studies that focus only on pure weakly increasing equilibrium strategies in auctions are valid also for equilibria in other strategy spaces.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have shown that in multi-unit auction games the discontinuities in payoffs are of a special form that allow to prove the existence of equilibrium in a straightforward manner. The key argument is that each bidder can bid in such a way that she wins any tie. Of course, the seller in an auction can not give units to all tied bidders. Since bidders are aware of the relevant tie-breaking rule, they adopt strategies that guarantee that no tie occurs in equilibrium with positive probability. Therefore, the equilibrium strategies in auction games secure payoffs as high as when winning all ties surely even if opponents change their strategies slightly.
For continuous distributions of values the tie-breaking rule that the seller uses does not matter. Even the efficient tie-breaking rule will not affect the set of equilibrium strategies. The game with this rule is payoff secure and summation upper semi-continuous and an equilibrium in weakly increasing strategies exists. Since the distributions of values are independent Proposition 11 guarantees that for any equilibrium strategy a bidder can use a pure weakly increasing best response strategy having the same payoff and distribution of bids. This allows to "purify" the equilibrium.
The set of weakly increasing equilibria is a representative subset of all equilibria for standard auctions with continuous distributions of values. This means that to study all possible equilibrium bid distributions one can re-strict one's attention to weakly increasing strategy spaces. The fact that the existence of equilibrium is independent of choosing a specific tie-breaking rule that allows one to eliminate strategies with ties seems to be fairly intuitive and applicable to other games that are payoff secure. The auction game with an efficient tie-breaking rule is a special case of the "augmented" auction game discussed in Lebrun (1996) . and Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame (2002) .
In this paper I present a unified approach to characterizing the equilibrium set of a large class of private value multi-unit auctions (cf. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) in single unit auctions). The approach proposed here allows us to understand exactly what assumptions are necessary to obtain an equilibrium strategy with the desirable features for private value auctions and even for some unusual combinations of auctions satisfying assumptions A1-A5.
One more challenging question is of how to extend the existence result presented in Theorem 9 to auctions with common value elements. Real-life auctions tend to have features of private and common values. Although in common value auctions a bidder does not know her value exactly, she typically prefers winning to losing a tie. By reasoning similar to the one applied in this article one might conjecture that the bidder can always bid in such a way as to assure herself of winning the tie implying no tie in equilibrium.
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Let me discuss the conditions on primitives that are sufficient for the existence of a specific upper boundb i,j (v i ) used in assumption A5 in Section 2. The following two lemmas formulate simple conditions on winning and losing price functions that guarantee the existence of an upper boundb i,j (v i ) and that are applicable to all auctions in example 1.
Lemma 14 Let us assume that there exists strictly increasing continuous
is an upper bound satisfying A5.
Proof. First realize that for every v i and bid b i ∈ B i belowb i (v i ), each bidder strictly prefers winning to losing a tie because in ties p Let me focus on the opposite case when b i,j >b i,j . If bothb i,j and b i,j either win or lose jth unit, then the bidder is not worse off because decreasing the jth unit bid weakly decreases the price by A2, and hence, bidding Proof. It is a standard result of probability theory that the set of probability distribution functions P i = {ω i : V i → [0, 1]} is a compact metric space in the topology of almost everywhere pointwise convergence for any i = 1, · · · , n. There is a one-to-one mapping from P i to the set of weakly 
by A5. In other words for all ties that occur with positive probability in a strategy profile each bidder strictly prefers to increase her strategy, she does so and as ε → 0 she gains the payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff when breaking every tie into her favor.
To finish Lemma 2 it is necessary to check that if any tie occurs with positive probability there is an ε for which no new tie occurs after the bidder changes the tied strategy by ε. By the standard results of probability theory each bidder places ex ante positive probability on at most countably many 36 bids. Then there is at most countably many ties in any original strategy profile and for at most countably many ε a tie occurs in the new profile after one bidder increases his strategy by ε.
Lemma 17
The payoff in an auction game with any tie-breaking rule consistent with ex post payoff (1) and assumptions A1, A4, A6 and A5 is locally payoff secure (see definition 6). ′ i,j the iteration process described above the proposition 11 converges to the pure weakly increasing best response strategy generating the same distribution of bids.
In the beginning part of the proposition I define the strategy such that for some j and any v i,−j I define the strategyb i (·) which is weakly increasing in v i,j and generates the same distribution of bids as m i ; P b i,j (v i ) < b i,j |v i,−j = P (m i,j < b i,j |v i,−j ) .
40
For every v i,−j it is a kind of "average" of all pure strategies b i (·) in support of m i . Therefore by the standard result of probability theory and Fubini's theoremb i (·) ∈B i andb i (·) and m i generate the same distribution of bids.
Moreoverb i (·) is within the two strategies in the support of m i and therefore it is the best response. Moreover following the steps of McAdams (2006) one can conclude that the iteration process converges the strategy converges to the pure weakly increasing best response strategy generating the same distribution of bids as the original mixed strategy m i . Similar results can be obtained for measurable best response strategy.
